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PREFACE
At the end of 1999 Prof. E.D. Prinsloo, then head of the Department of 
Philosophy at the University of South Africa, retired. In the six years in 
which he occupied this post the University and the Department faced 
enormous challenges. Ihe members of the Department decided to honour 
him for his contributions to the Department of Philosophy, particularly as 
Head of the Department, and also for his contributions to philosophy in 
general, by means of this Festschrift. Emeritus Professor A.P.J. Roux and 
Mr Pieter Coetzee were requested to act as editors. Colleagues and friends 
of Prof Prinsloo from different philosophy departments and from different 
disciplines were invited to participate. Eventually it turned out that most 
of the contributions received in some or other way touched on one of his 
enduring interests, culture; it became Culture in Retrospect.
Prof. Prinsloo’s career as a philosophy teacher started on 1 January, 1967 
when he was appointed as a lecturer at the University of South Africa. In 
1983 he was promoted to senior lecturer, in 1988 to associate professor 
and in 1993 to professor. In 1994 he was appointed head of department.
In a career which stretched over 33 years there were many highlights. We 
mention only two which had a decisive influence on philosophy at Unisa: 
the initiative he took to open up African philosophy and make it part of 
teaching and research programmes, and secondly, the labour he undertook 
to rescue studies in logic.
When Prof. Prinsloo became head of the Philosophy Department in 1994, 
African philosophy did not really form part of the philosophical scene in 
South Africa. A course or a module in African Philosophy was offered at 
three universities but it had little impact and there was no co-ordination 
between these institutions. It had no place on the programmes of the 
South African Philosophical Society and no articles on it were published 
in the South African Journal o f Philosophy. However, it became clear to 
Prof. Prinsloo and the members of his Department that this situation was 
untenable. The Department accepted it as a departmental research project 
to find out about African philosophy, to research specific issues in this 
field, and to establish contacts with academics who specialized in it. Prof.
(viii)
Prinsloo’s application to Unisa's Research and Bursary Committee for 
financial support resulted in a substantial grant for a period of three years. 
This led to the establishment of the Research Unit for African Philosophy 
(RUFAP) in the Department of Philosophy with Prof. Prinsloo as 
chairperson. RUFAP organised three annual colloquia on African 
philosophy to which leading African philosophers of international 
standing, such as Godwin Sogolo (Nigeria) and Kwasi Wiredu (Ghana 
and U.S.A.). were invited as keynote speakers. These international 
contacts were kept up and extended and the Department benefited in 
various ways from them in pursuing its African philosophy projects. The 
colloquia were well attended by local philosophers many of whom 
presented well-researched papers on aspects of African philosophy; thus 
the Unisa initiative affected most universities in the country. 'Hie 
proceedings of the second colloquium1 and a selection of papers read at 
all three quiloquia: were published, thus starting a knowledge and 
database. From the RUFAP activities it became clear to Prof. Prinsloo 
that some transformation of the course content in philosophy had become 
inevitable - African philosophy had to become a part of teaching 
programmes. TTiis led to the restructuring of the courses and syllabi in the 
Department and the preparation of completely new study material, all in 
record time. Graduate students were also sensitized in this field and a few 
dissertations and theses in this field prepared under Prof. Prinsloo’s 
guidance have already been accepted. At present African philosophy is 
well established at Unisa and the staff is involved in different projects.
'Ibe second initiative concerns logic. For many years Unisa offered Logic. 
In the three courses formal logic comprized about one third of the 
contents with theory of meaning, epistemology and philosophy of science 
making up the rest. Unfortunately the number of students who enrolled 
for the Logic courses decreased with the result that when Unisa started 
with rationalization they had to be phased out. 'Die philosophy sections 
could be accommodated in other ways but it seemed as if logic, 
particularly at a higher level, came to the end of the road, which would
1 Malherbe, J.G. (ed.) 1996. Decolonizing the Mind. Department of Philosophy, Unisa: Pretoria.
* Roux, A.P.J & Coetzee, P.H. ad . Beyond the question o f  African Philosophy Department of 
Philosophy, Unisa: Pretoria.
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have been a loss not only in the Unisa context but for South Africa, 
because Unisa was the only university which offered advanced logic in 
the context of philosophy. ITie computer scientists were at that time 
toying with the idea of introducing a course in Artificial Intelligence. 
Prof. Prinsloo saw a possibility for cooperation and started negotiations 
with them. This was not as easy as it sounds because not only were two 
Departments involved but two faculties with different cultures. After 
months of preparations Artificial Intelligence with Logic, to be taught by 
the Department of Philosophy, as one of the major subjects, was 
approved. In this way studies in logic at all levels were guaranteed and as 
a spin off, the staffing position of the Department of Philosophy also 
improved. Again it meant the restructuring of courses, the development 
of new syllabi and new study material but Prof. Prinsloo and his lecturers 
were ready when the Artificial Intelligence course was launched at the 
beginning of 1997 as planned.
These and other similar initiatives in teaching and research were 
underpinned by Prof. Prinsloo’s preparedness to question existing views 
and practices, his inclination to approach academic studies in a ‘practical’ 
way, his sensitivity to interdisciplinary possibilities, and, as befits a good 
teacher, his ability to plan teaching programmes with the students and 
their needs and interests in mind. With these also go true leadership 
abilities, the ability to convince people to participate in what he sees as 
worthwhile projects - and to do so with enthusiasm.
Prof. Prinsloo studied as an extra-mural student at the University of 
Pretoria, where he obtained a B. A. degree in 1957 with Philosophy (with 
distinction) and Psychology as majors, adding Greek III and Afrikaans- 
Nederlands III for non-degree purposes. In 1962 he obtained the Higher 
Education Diploma and the next year he passed the M.A. in Philosophy 
with distinction with a dissertation Die wetenskapsbeskouing van Curt 
John Ducasse with Prof. P.S. Dreyer as supervisor. He obtained the 
D.Phil. also with distinction, in 1982 on the thesis Die fenomenologiese 
benadering, with Prof. P.S. Dreyer as promoter. As part of his doctoral 
studies Prof, lfrinsloo spent his sabbatical leave in 1977 at the University 
of Eeiden where he studied under the guidance of Prof. C. A. van Peursen, 
wellknown for his contributions to the philosophy of culture, and Prof. G.
(X)
Nuchelmans. who applied the analytical methodology of Austin, 
Wittgenstein and Ryle.
Prof. ITinsloo always favoured the metaphilosophical view of philosophy 
as philosophizing. 'ITiis played a part in his teaching where he emphasised 
discussion and argumentation and always tried to create opportunities in 
this regard for his students. But he also practised this. He was a keen 
participant in national and international conferences, and played an active 
role in professional societies such as the South African Philosophical 
Society, ITie Wittgenstein Society, Hie Phenomenological Society, Hie 
Society of the History of Science, and the Ubuntu Society. He read the 
following papers at international conferences: ‘Criteria for cultural 
differences’ in 1986 at the Tenth International Wittgenstein Symposium, 
Kirchberg, Austria; ‘The context dependency of rationality’ in 1988 at the 
Twelfth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg, Austria; ‘The 
function of personal and impersonal idioms in explanations’ in 1989 at 
the eighteenth International Congress ol the History of Science, Munich, 
Germany; Language games and forms of life’ in 1989 at the Thirteenth 
International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg, Austria; ‘ The status 
of explanation in African thinking’ in 1993 at the Nineteenth World 
Congress of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia; ‘Metaphors and science’, and 
‘Constitution and artificial intelligence’ in 1993 at the Nineteenth 
International Congress of the History of Science, Zaragosa, Spain.
ITof. Prinsloo became interested in talk about culture soon after he left 
school. In the early nineteen fifties themes such as cultural differences, the 
advancement of cultures and the link between culture and politics were 
often discussed. He was an eager but critical participant. His formal 
studies gave an edge to this interest and broadened his horizon. He 
concentrated on methodology particularly because this seemed to him of 
crucial importance in addressing the generally accepted difference 
between natural and cultural sciences which he found problematic. In the 
nineteen eighties he started on a book on the philosophy of culture. At 
that stage the course structure of the Department was revised and he 
decided to develop and teach a course in the Philosophy of Culture and 
the book had to wait. He published two important articles on aspects of 
culture in the South African Journal o f Philosophy. Perhaps with the new
(xi)
freedom of retirement he will return to the book. At the time of his 
retirement he was busy with research on a different aspect of the culture 
debate - post-colonial thinking. His main concern here is the content of 
the reaction to colonial domination.
Prinsloo also always found time to take part in community activities. 
During his years as a student at the University of Pretoria he served in 
different capacities on the Extramural Students’ Representative Council 
and the Central Students’ Council. He was chairperson of the Afrikaanse 
Studentebond for three consecutive years and a founding member of the 
Philosophical Society. He was awarded with honorary colours and a 
medal by the Central Students’ Council in 1963 for outstanding services 
to the student community. For a time he also concerned himself with 
marriage counselling.
Erasmus Daniel Prinsloo was bom on 24 September 1934. He grew up on 
a farm in the Bronkhorstspruit district. He matriculated (First Class, 
distinction in Mathematics) in 1952 at the Afrikaanse Hoër Seunsskool, 
Pretoria and occupied different clerical positions before he took up 
teaching in 1963. He is married to Reinette.
1AFRICAN IDENTITY AND THE MATTER OF 
UNIVERSALS
Prof Joseph Margolis
Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
I
When I reflect on black African identity - politically, and philosophically - 
I think of a pure construction, an invention that for reasons of contingent 
history is now more than incipiently real despite having been a fiction 
through nearly all of the history for which it has been claimed. In that 
curious sense, 'racial' identity, 'black' identity, has, by a remarkable irony, 
proved to have a function favourable to achieving a measure of continental 
solidarity in spite of the fact that it could not possibly support any of the 
racial or cultural 'universals' it ever invoked. The young American-trained 
African philosopher Kwame Appiah argues convincingly for instance that 
there could not have been anything like an African identity earlier than the 
turn into the twentieth century, with the first genuinely deep penetration of 
Eurocentric conceptions into the whole of African life; that European 
patterns actually exacerbated the fragmentation of any would-be pan- 
African identity, but that, in spite of that, it did also contribute, in time, to 
an increasing convergence among oppositional movements capable of 
yielding whatever unity was possible. But it was always constructive and 
opportumstical.1 In that sense, black African identity will be (already is) an 
artifact of African solidarity, not the other way around. Political 
effectiveness is a talent, I hardly dare say a skill, for sensing where a 
contingent and changeable praxis may yield in the direction of increased 
power - for a time at least. It has no use for universality or invariance, 
except as an ideological instrument that may actually serve our political 
interests. Bear that in mind, please. *
See Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy o f  Culture (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), Ch. 9,
2Here, the African experience is hardly different front the European - or the 
Eurocentric - with which it has been inexorably bound, except of course for 
the hardly negligible fact that it has been mercilessly exploited by the other, 
disordered and deformed to such an extent that its provisional pan-African 
identity can, at the moment, be little more than that of the reactive 
perception of a continuing victim and relatively powerless aspirant (or 
supplicant) petitioning and needing to reenter a global market the 
Eurocentric world commands more effectively now than ever it did at the 
beginning of the century The conspiracy of history is bound to refashion 
the disadvantageous universals of 'race' that Afrocentric and Eurocentric 
theorists had implicitly agreed on, however innocently, in pondering the 
'inability' of the black world to compete as well as other 'races' sharing the 
same earth
The enthusiasms of W E B. du Bois: and Leopold Senghor, for instance, 
in search of the essence of blackness, could hardly fail to play into the 
hands of the adverse progressivisms drawn from such theories as those of 
Lewis Morgan and E.B. Taylor; for, i f  the patterns of societal progress 
were genuinely universal in the species, as the evolutionists argued, then, 
on the plainest evidence, the black achievement could support only the most 
unfavourable finding. One could easily argue, then, that to reject the 
pertinence of race now, now that the racial identity card has been played - 
and found wanting - confirms our worst suspicions: except that, on 
perfectly independent grounds, it never had a proper footing and was 
doomed (as hindsight advises) to play into a power game it had no chance 
of making into a fair contest. And, o f course, it has none yet.
The trouble is, the 'black' African world - you see how impossible it is to 
avoid the epithet - sees no other corrective ideology before it but one that 
rests on an appeal to a profound 'racial' injustice which, in being made 
explicit, risks its own irrelevance. In this, I see little difference between
! Compare, W.E.B. Du Bois, The Conservation of Races', in Philip S. Foner (ed), W.E.B. Du Bois 
Speaks: Speeches and Addresses, 1890-1919 (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970); and Dusk o f  
Dawn: An Essay toward an Autobiography o fa  Race Concept (New York: Schocken, 1968). See, 
also, Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and Illusion ofRace',Cultural 
Inquiry, Autumn 1985.
3'black' African experience and recent Afro- (African-American) experience, 
'except' for differences of scale (which are hardly negligible) and, more 
tantalizingly, the potential promise of the evolved cultures of the entire 
African continent (possibly joined by the black Caribbean world) that might 
draw on indigenous sources of ethnic power ultimately inseparable from 
their recent hybrid forms But of course, the promise of diverse ethnic 
solidarities signifies as well the devastating tribal wars that threaten the 
entire pan-African vision.
In the United States, 'African' sources are pretty well a form of self- 
deceptive nostalgia. African-Americans are simply Americans they are 
Afro- (politically) only in the sense of the perceived injustice that was never 
rightly corrected m their history, the effects of which still estrange and 
disorganize them politically, but which they believe are recoverable through 
the force of their racial perception. (They could not be more mistaken in 
their prophecy, though their memories are accurate enough.) African- 
Americans must abandon being 'Afro-' if they are to succeed now in 
America. It's also likely that 'black' Africa cannot possibly succeed unless 
it now finds a way to be 'pan-African', which, frankly, means abandoning 
all reference to racial essentialisms and dampening ethnic primacies. In a 
word, black Africans are not pan-Africans but they need to be; and 
African-Americans are merely Americans who can no longer afford to 
divide their identity and commitment in the racially fashionable way. (All 
this is meant in purely calculative, hardly 'moral', terms.)
African-Americans view themselves as having been 'deprived' of 'their' 
ethnic heritage. They are right to see in this the absence of the very source 
of power on which, alone, they might have functioned politically as a 
unique people. Apart from genealogies, however, black ethnic sources can 
hardly be traced, in America, beyond slavery - which is to say, not in the 
African way at all. Otherwise, 'African-' signifies a local juridical claim 
that the American Supreme Court has all but dismissed. African-Americans 
bear witness, of course, to their peculiarly mixed fortunes: to the continued 
massive disadvantage of remaining African-American, which they cannot 
overcome by their own power and which they cannot meaningfully 
abandon; and to the visible rise of an all-but-gratuitous, much-publicized,
4small, even affluent, and politically marginalized black middle class (less 
marginal in the white world than in the black), whose existence has no 
noticeable affect on the growing disparity between whites and blacks and 
for which blacks cannot even take political credit. (Think, for instance, of 
Tom Wolfe’s 'Radical Chic'.)
It was probably a very plausible guess after the success of the civil rights 
movement in the sixties that 'black' politics should continue to be 'racial' in 
America. But the would-be allies of the African-Americans - the 
Hispanamericans, various Asian populations, women as a political force, 
gays, American Indians - find no natural alliance with them; or, as in such 
bland coalitions as the one led by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, these other 
minorities outstrip them at their own game (the Hispaneramericans, 
women), or have no strong interest in appearing as a racial group at all (the 
Asians), or cannot possibly succeed by frontal political means of any kind 
(the gays), or have given up confrontational politics except through the 
courts (native American tribes) All of these 'minorities' are likely to 
succeed, in time, by means that are not particularly racially focused: the 
gays, by a change in American sexual taste and tolerance; women, by 
infiltrating every other political community; the Hispanics, by their ethnic 
resources and sheer size and concentration; the Asians, by the professional 
skills they visibly excel at and by their lack of any link to the troubling 
periods of early American history; native populations, by pressing the 
terms of existing treaties.
The race card was played to maximal advantage, in the United States, by 
Martin Luther King, but now seems to have spent its resources in its 
victory. No doubt Americans remain racist at a very profound level of their 
shallow politics, but they also refuse to permit their politics to continue to 
be conducted along explicitly racist lines. And no doubt, black America is 
not racist in its global vision, but it believes in the advantage of conducting 
its business along invented racial lines.
Now, a new breed of notably abstract political and economic forces - forces 
that cannot be confined geographically, demographically, or even 
physically - are gathering for the next phase of global hegemony, in terms
5that are almost completely indifferent to racial, ethnic, even conventional 
political struggles, except opportunistically or with an eye to eliminating all 
'retrograde' conflicts. These forces will have little or no regard for the 
principled resolution of perceived injustices or the defense of rights or 
political entitlements among second- and third-world peoples, except as 
may impede the flow of informationally embodied power. Perseveration at 
the level of racial struggles will signify an inconvenient and unacceptable 
cost: the evidence will probably appear in more or less permanently 
dismissed populations and regions maintained at whatever sub-subsistence 
levels prove possible without revolt, possibly a good part of Africa, 
perhaps even among first-world populations if deemed 'necessary' Seen in 
such terms, which are not entirely fanciful, pan-African visions are already 
partly 'behind the curve'.3
The truth is, we are on the edge of an entirely new 'cultural' order that has 
already begun to diminish, palpably, all of the supposed universal, 
invariant, necessary, historically entrenched human values of the 
Eurocentric world. The full collision between canonical Eurocentric norms 
and the various social norms of Asia has yet to be tested. We can be 
reasonably certain, however, that the first will give way to the 
technologized demands of an abstract, increasingly autonomous global 
economy that will elude the grasp of most conventional national states. At 
the moment, it is largely the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and 
China that appear best able to afford to mingle explicitly the perceived 
requirements of their 'abstract' role in the new economy with their 
traditional conceptions of national power. This gives the misleading 
impression that the continuity of the West’s discourse regarding political 1
1 For a well-regarded analysis of these tendencies, see Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions o f  
Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1996), particularly the new Afterword. Bell’s clarity is 
difficult to better, but his insistence on the sacred, [on] what is beyond us and cannot be transgressed' 
(p. 338), is itself a dated, however humane, complaint that will be swept out by the very forces he 
is bent on chronicling. Whateverthe 'political morality' ofthe future will be, it will be a 'construction' 
of our altered history. The superannuation of'racial'justice, local or global, is, hard as it may be to 
admit, a matter of historical timing'. One can already foresee that most ofthe humane values prized 
in the West for instance will either be abandoned or radically redefined. It is not, as Bell supposes, 
the result of exalting individualism over social membership and responsibility as it is the redefinition 
of the inseparable relationship between individual and society (see pp. 285-287).
6morality and justice (notably: human rights) can be counted on to offset tire 
'rational' demands of an idealized global capitalism that is bound to view 
history and social formation in entirely instrumental terms.4
But even if this proved to be an exaggerated picture of a change we do not 
yet fully understand, we cannot ignore the unprecedented vulnerability of 
'racially'- and ethnically-centered strategies and conceptions of justice, they 
all require a source of power they cannot command at will - alliances for 
instance with the interests of one or another of the first-world powers 
already mentioned Whatever the African motivation for continental 
solidarity, whatever the historical conscience of Western Europe regarding 
the colonial exploitation of Africa, whatever the validity of African- 
American resentment, the global drive for skilled labour and reliable 
markets and sheer control are not likely to make common cause with any 
such thinking, except for the contingency of a perceived advantage in the 
flow and accumulation of world capital Marx would have been closer to 
his truth, writing now, then ever he was in the early stages of nineteenth- 
century capitalism. The humanizing ideologies that will be required - and 
they will certainly be required - have hardly begun to take debatable form 
The question remains whether, like the pan-Africans and African- 
Americans, 'we' w ill be too late to avoid the new forms of exploitation that 
will surely ride roughshod over every entrenched convention of social 
justice.
II
There is a growmg vacuum, a break in the conceptual ozone layer of our 
global politics, that threatens to permit an increasing fraction of world 
market forces to spin out of local political control; no doubt abetted by the 
shifting interests of the primary states that could in principle agree to 
control such forces They cannot be reliably controlled piecemeal, even by 
such large or relatively advanced states as Russia, India, Pakistan, Brazil, 
Argentina, Indonesia, Korea, South Africa. Furthermore, all of the states
* For a particularly perceptive recent analysis, see Immanuel Wallerstein, The End o f  the World as 
We Know It: Social Science fo r  the Twenty-First Century (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999).
7that are the charter members of the world’s advanced trading bloc are 
divided in their need to pursue the relentless rationale of the new economy 
and their own loyalties (on whatever grounds) to conventional views of 
social justice and equality at home. They yield increasingly in the direction 
of the first and they contrive, ad hoc, to dampen the disorders threatened 
by reversals involving the second.
The strategy of featuring the themes of'racial' unity and injustice finds its 
principal sense of political realism within the terms of such processes, but 
it misjudges the field. It correctly senses the vulnerability of governments 
under these new tensions - witness China - but it wrongly believes that the 
'racial' issue has any chance of being more than a subsidiary or an 
opportunistic feint.
There might have been a moment, for instance, when Islamic solidarity 
might have been effectively rallied as a somewhat 'racial' theme (among 
diverse societies) linked by the scarcity of oil But that moment is surely 
gone - or gone for the present. Technology has defeated it (as in Gamal 
Nasser and the Ayatollah Khomanei), and nothing comparable has made an 
appearance. Now, pan-African themes can collect only around a contract 
of dependency to first-world powers: if survival (in the most literal sense, 
as in Africa) is the principal objective, then so be it. In any case, it will not 
be able to be detached from larger efforts to fill the deep conceptual lacuna 
that the twenty-first century promises. That is the ozone breach of our 
nearest future.
Political forces will of course play out their hand: there is no way to halt 
the contest of power. But it is never entirely clear how actual vectorial 
forces will finally be exerted. Theory’s role lies chiefly in rehearsing the 
rationales for vanous options. For instance: the mystifying essentialism of 
négntude has had to give way to a clear grasp of its vacuity and dangerous
8self-manipulation and has had to concede the sheer 'invention' of its own
ontology.5
That, perhaps, is the single most important lesson: viz., that essence, in the 
human world, is a form of opportunism and invention - at some 
considerable risk - formed under the terms of an analysis of supposed 
political advantage (or even philosophical clarity).
I’m sure that what I am saying risks sounding like the worst sort of 
cynicism or opportunism or mere conceptual fatigue or a theoretical 
blunder of a kind that 'must' be corrected or simply the meddling of a white 
voice. 1 know, 1 may say, no stronger African voice, more alert politically 
to the issues of'essential humanity' and 'ethnic particularity', that is also 
philosophically acute and practicing today, than that of the Ghanaian 
(Akan) philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu But he is a partisan of essences and 
universalism, and I think that these notions can never be more than 
'instrumental' or 'strategic', in a sense that never treats ethnic or racial 
essences in philosophically realist terms 1 hope he will not misunderstand 
me, therefore, or take me to oppose 'for the wrong reasons' his very clear 
universalism. I see its attraction (and I have no right to demean it) at the 
level of open ideology, though I’m bound to say, 1 cannot see how the 
appeal to 'humanity' can be expected to be more effective now, than, say, 
Senghor’s négrítude, which Wiredu himself politely sets aside. The colonial 
imagination that Senghor opposed was inclined to say, when it had actually 
read him: 'Just what we have always thought! Thank you.' The capitalist 
imagination that Wiredu hopes to enlist (or at least render more responsive 
to the corrective efforts of the African world) will be inclined to say: 'So 
it’s true! Those at the lowest and highest levels of "capacitation" [to invoke
Compare Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Orphée noir', in Léopold Sédar Senghor (ed.)Anthologie de la nouvelle 
poésie negre el madgasche de langue/ranfame (Paris: Presses Universitaires dc France, 1972) and 
Marcel Towa, Léopold Sédar Senghor: négntude ou servitude? (Clé: Yaoundé, 1971). (I have 
benefited here from D A  Masolo, African Philosophy in Search o f  Identity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1994). See, also, Léopold S. Senghor, 'Negritude and African Socialism', in P.H. 
Coetzee and AP.J. Roux (eds). The African Philosophy Reader (London: Routledge, 1998), 
reprinted from K. Kirkwood (ed.), St. A nthony’s papers, no. 15 (Oxford), pp. 9-22; and Frantz 
Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967).
9Amartya Sen’s very sensible corrective to Western notions of justice6] do 
share the same humanity, after all Period!'
I do indeed have serious misgivings about appeals to universal humanity 
anywhere - whether in moral and political matters or in the analysis of 
science and ordinary communication. I cannot see what determinate 
questions such appeals can possibly resolve convincingly - and I think most 
arguments that rely on universalisms are seriously misguided and mistaken 
or completely vacuous. So I am bound to raise doubts about the startingly 
plain argument that Wiredu offers in reviewing the sensitive matter of 
cultural differences:
Our question |he says] is 'Are there Cultural Universals?' I 
propose a reductio ad absurdum proof for an affirmative 
answer as follows. Suppose there were no cultural universals.
Then intercultural communication would be impossible. But 
there is intercultural communication. Therefore, there are 
cultural universals . . . .  it is tautologically obvious that for 
any two persons to communicate at all they must share some 
common medium of communication. In turn this implies that 
at some level they must share a conceptual scheme, however 
minimal its dimensions. Any such scheme of concepts is a 
universal for, at least, the given participants in the 
communication. The question now is 'Is there any scheme of 
concepts which can be shared by all the cultures of 
humankind?' . . . .  The answer, in fact, is 'Everything'.7
I see the imagined political importance of insisting on the cognitive and 
normative 'universals' of humankind in the face of the alleged reluctance of 
the West to 'admit' such features. But I cannot see what is gained; and, *I
6 See Amartya Sen, On Economic Inequality, expanded ed. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).
I have explored the issue of'essential' values in the context of Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum's work 
m an as yet unpublished paper, 'Morality as Insuperably Culture-Bound', which bears on Wiredu’s 
thesis but does not mention it
Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 21.
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more important. I cannot see how Wiredu proposes to confirm his claim in 
any nonvacuous way.
I oppose the thesis, therefore, on the grounds that universalist ideologies are 
a dime a dozen and are as divisive as any openly 'particularist' ethnic 
orientation you can imagine (in fact, are hardly more than such teachings 
which have 'succeeded' politically); also, on the grounds that the argument 
obscures the truth that would-be 'universals' actually range in the blithest 
way over our greatest differences and deepest disagreements - at any 'level' 
you care to mention
I see no 'communicative' failure, for instance, between the Serbs and the 
Kosovars or between the Hutu and the Tutsi, no matter what 
incommensurabilities obtain But what does that signify about 'sharing' 
umvcrsals at any 'levell Nothing that I can fathom. I cannot see the 
reductio at all
I don't regard this as a purely verbal matter, 1 may say On the contrary, 
it is, in the most practical sense, absolutely decisive for the success of any 
and every effort at understanding the nature of human understanding, or 
communication, or agreement, on norms and values, or any of the rest of 
the usual undertakings But nothing is gained by pronouncements on shared 
umversals except what any such affirmation itself effectively entails - that 
is, by being affirmed and believed and politically supported, as opposed to 
its being merely 'true'! There’s the difference between an ideology and a 
philosophically objective analysis of'universals'. I offer the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in evidence. I
I do in fact take Wiredu at his word: 'it is tautologically obvious', he says, 
'that for any two persons to communicate at all they must share some 
medium of communication' Of course it’s tautological in the same sense 
in which, famously, opium has 'dormitive powers'. We may in fact discover 
what the factor in opium is that answers to those powers. But can we claim 
that what answers to communicative success is a universal concept that all 
humans share - or are we clear what it means to claim that they do? And 
is it even the case that what answers to opium’s dormitive powers is a
11
'universal' in the required sense? I very much doubt it. I more than doubt 
it I say there are no demonstrable 'universals' in the sense required, though 
there are certainly occasions of successful communication.
I quite agree that respect for 'particular' (and different) local cultures is 
fully compatible with respect for what is 'common' to mankind - very 
possibly is necessary for such respect; but I cannot see that we add 
anything in introducing 'cultural universals' beyond what the parties to such 
an agreement would be willing to support - which will be general, never 
universal in the sense of being exceptionless (or, necessarily exceptionless). 
Whatever they support in that spirit may indeed count as the effective 
'cultural universals' they have 'found' - which of course others will dispute. 
There will he nothing left over. There are no universals that hold in spite 
o f being seriously contested, or there are too many that are incompatible 
with one another.
Let me put this in a teasing way. I communicate with my cats and they, 
with me But I deny that there is any concept that we share in virtue o f  
which we do communicate. Most people agree that we communicate with 
our pets. If you say that we do so through some 'medium of communication' 
(gestures, utterances), I would not for the life of me deny what you say - 
you might be saying something quite instructive. But 1 don't think you 
could be saying anything helpful in the way of isolating an actual, 
independent 'animal1 universal that, qua universal, was a determinate 
condition of that particular success - the one that obtains when I call my 
cats to feed. Now, I claim that the same is true fo r  language and 
communication among humans. I
I can put the point in another way. I f  you argue that there must be 
universally shared concepts that are common coin in every successful 
communication, then I should argue that, for every would-be determinate 
concept of that sort. I would be able to demonstrate that the parties to the 
exchange cannot be shown to share, and indeed need not share, that 
concept; or I should demonstrate that saying that they do simply 
tautologizes the entire issue in the direction of the dormitive powers of 
opium. For a hint - for no more than a hint - consider this: if you say that
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the ugly quarrels at abortion clinics show at least that 'pro-life' and 'pro- 
choice' phalanxes agree on the inviolable w orth of human life, 1 draw your 
attention to the fact that neither side would see matters that way, or each 
w ould view' the generic doctrine as entailing entirely incompatible abortion 
policies; or else they might be said to 'share' the same concept in the 
Pickwickian sense that each claims the phrase as exclusively their own. Is 
there more to it than that?
Peter Galison makes a very plausible case (controversial, I don't deny, 
since it concedes the coherence of the incommensurabilist thesis shared by 
Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feycrabend and the Edinburgh sociologists of 
science and philosophy) to the effect that it is quite possible for a company 
of cooperating high-technology scientists to 'agree1 on what their joint 
experiments yield, without actually sharing the same operative 'paradigm' 
(read concepts).8 The idea is coherent - also plausible - even if you don’t 
happen to favour Kuhn's or Feyerabend’s incommensurabilities - if for no 
other reason than that, short of Platonism (which is surely inaccessible to 
humans), the judgement that we have indeed discovered a conceptual 
universal of any kind is itself a consensual artifact of discourse, not an 
independent enabling condition of such discourse.9 1 am pressing the 
argument, here, in terms of the natural sciences, but, in general, I am 
concerned in this discussion with 'practical1, not 'theoretical', universals. 
(Although I am also prepared to insist that that distinction is more than 
doubtful.)
In effect, this means, not that there are no universals but that universal 
concepts, like concepts in general (where what we mean by concepts 
answers to the predicates we use, which are themselves 'general', in being 
applicable to indefinitely many things if they are applicable to any), arc so 
designated always 'after the fact' so to say. Concepts are, only trivially or 
redundantly, conditions o f  successful communication; otherwise they are *1
* See Peter Galison, Image and Logic: A Material Culture o f  Microphysics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1997), Ch. 1.
1 I have developed the point in a paper (as yet unpublished), 'Incommensurability Modestly
Recovered', presented at a conference: 'Incommensurability (and related matters)’. University of
Hannover, Hannover, Germany, June 11-13, 1999
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products (of a sort), very abstract products at that, o f  discourse itself, or 
they are merely nominalizations hypostasized from active predicates. (That 
is, of course, the opium problem again.)
I have made a lot of this - you may even think too much - because it seems 
to me that if we remove the chimera of essences, universals, umversalistic 
norms, and similar exotica from our debates about science and political 
morality alike, we force ourselves to view our practical commitments in an 
entirely different light. If you allow me to take advantage of Wiredu once 
again, let me juxtapose two remarks he makes in the opening page of his 
book. He says:
without ['the possibility and actual existence of cultural']
universals intercultural communication must be impossible, 
and
the possibility of cultural universals is predicated on our
common biological identity as a species of bipeds."1
There are many ways of challenging this enthymeme. But the principal 
thing to notice is that Wiredu has in mind answering the question, 'What is 
it that unifies us?' I don’t deny that 'what' unifies us is that we are human 
and share a natural language (for which there are always apt bilinguals).
'The beginning. . . .  of an answer [Wiredu says] is [that] it is our biologico- 
cultural identity as homines sapientes' 1 If 1 understand this correctly, then 
if we should ever communicate with Martians, for instance, creatures of 
another 'race' altogether, then a slightly different inference would hold - to 
the same purpose, however. In fact it holds 'already' in the famous sign- 
language exchanges between the gorilla Koko and her human trainer, and 
(as I should argue) it also holds between my cats and me (if it holds at all). 
It is of course trivially true that our 'biology' makes our culturally formed 
communication 'possible'. But if the foregoing argument is at all 
reasonable, then what in our biology makes sharing concepts possible will 10
10 Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars, p. 1.
11 Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars, p. 22.
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be theoretically assigned this or that part of our biology as a result of its 
being agreed that we do share this or that concept and that our biology 
makes it possible!
My own way of putting this is to say that all sub-functions of our molar 
functioning (the biological facilitation of our linguistic success) are 
intelligible only as those sub-functions. They cannot then he independently 
identified, they are defined only relationally. I claim that this marks the 
same difficulty that subverts all computationalist views of the mind and any 
and all would-be moral, political, or scientific 'universals'. That is not an 
uninteresting challenge, that is, a challenge that moves from 'practice' to 
'theory'.
Now it follows from this, by parity of reasoning, that our linguistic 
success, which Wiredu agrees is primarily cultural, is made 'possible' (we 
may say), apart from our biology, by our sharing a common language and 
a common culture . . . and a common tradition . and a common history 
. . and so on. But nearly everyone agrees that a 'common tradition' is 
nothing more than a nominalization from what we project as predicatively 
common to our ordinary activities So there cannot be a conceptual gain 
there Hans-Georg Gadamer is fond of saying, for instance, that though we 
belong to the same tradition, there is no tradition to which we belong And 
Wittgenstein says in (what seems to me to be) the same general vein that, 
although speaking a language is 'following a rule', there is no rule that we 
follow.12
We rarely stop to consider how subversive these remarks are, regarding our 
confidence in isolating any genuinely universal concepts shared by the 
whole of humanity and believed necessary for objective discourse in science 
or politics. We isolate such 'universals' all the time, of course. But 
empirical studies show, for instance, that different societies (culturally and 
linguistically different societies) don’t actually ever use even such 
elementary notions as the common prepositions - in, on, and under, or
12 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G E M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1953), Pt. L §§201-202.
15
colour words, for that matter - in precisely the same way.13 W.V. Quine 
thinks it is entirely possible to work empirically (and in a way without 
behavioural detection) with very different ontologies.14 And it may be 
plausibly argued that Chinese or some other language may not have the 
same universal structure Noam Chomsky supposes every natural language 
has (except in the 'dormitive' sense). It is certainly not demonstrable that 
every language must have such a structure, m order to account for the fact 
that we do 'understand' Chinese and other languages. On the argument, 
'understanding', 'communicating', 'knowing' are themselves consensual 
posits that we propose under conditions of pertinent fluency and lack of 
misadventure.
There is a further nest of extremely curious - but very important - 
consequences of the universalizing tendency, which I must mention here. 
Theorists who admit 'essences' and 'umversals' begin to characterize our 
cognitive powers (by which we manage theoretical and practical affairs) in 
such a way as to be congruent with our insisting on their role vis-a-vis such 
universals! Certainly the most impressive effort of this kind appears already 
in Aristotle, who invents out of whole cloth a unique rational ability, nous 
he calls it - as close to the divine as one can imagine - the sole function of 
which is, precisely, to discern the invariant essences of things that he is 
prepared to postulate.15 Nothing could be prettier.
If it were not for that ability, Aristotle would have had a much more 
difficult task in formulating his own formidable conception of science, 
since, particularly in the biological sciences, he himself finds evidence that 
the empirical data do not quite conform with his official doctrine; and, 
particularly in the Ethics and Politics, the very idea of invariant essences 
is more than dubious. Consider, also, that, for all his talk about the Forms, 
you cannot find anything of Aristotle’s confidence in Plato. And, among the
13 See Melissa Bowerman, 'Learning a Semantic System: What role do cognitive predispositions play?' 
in Paul Bloom (ed.), Language Acquisition: Core Readings (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); also, 
Eleanor Rosch, 'Principles of Categorization’, in Cognition and Categorization, eds Eleanor Rosch 
and Barbara B. Lloyd (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978)
14 W.V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), §§15-16.
15 See Aristotle, DeAnima, Bk. Ill, chs. 4-8.
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recent 'Kantians', notably John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas, it is plainly 
taken for granted that rational agents (occupied with practical affairs) 
regularly think in universalistic terms. They will have nothing to do with 
norms that are not strictly universalistic! I admit that philosophers and 
political theorists since Kant think this way more insistently than they ever 
did before Kant, but it does produce some very unworldly scenarios, as one 
sees in both Rawls and Habermas.16
Gayatri Spivak has in fact turned the tables very deftly on this general line 
of thinking. Her strategy requires two steps: first, she remarks that the 
genuinely human agent of political life is imperceptibly displaced by an 
invented abstract rational subject (or something of the sort) - Kant is the 
paradigm - and practical matters (among both colonial peoples and their 
colonizers, which provide the context she favours for drawing out the 
political importance of the tendency in question), come to be formulated in 
terms o f  these displacing abstractions, and, second, the expose of that 
same practice, by which we are meant to be returned to the perception of 
actual political reality, tends to be discounted (by the partisans of the other) 
as being itself out of touch with just such ('confirmed') practices.17 I find 
her argument entirely reasonable; and I remind you that the same pattern, 
which makes an ambiguous appearance already in Descartes and which 
reaches its apotheosis (in Western philosophy) in Husserl and (very 
differently) in Heidegger - where the matter takes the impossible form of 
deciding what the right relationship is between the human being and the 
Transcendental Ego or Dasetn - becomes the foremost conceptual puzzle 
of philosophy’s entire undertaking.18 Which begins with a complete fiction. 
(Which therefore affects practical life 'even' in Africa, ever at the end of a 
long journey: witness Wiredu!)
“  See Jdrgen Habermas, 'Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification', Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholson 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).
17 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique o f  Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History o f  the 
Vanishing Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), Ch. 1.
“  See for instance Eugen Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Ideal o f  a Transcendental Theory 
o f  Method, trans. Ronald Bruzina (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).
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I see a much thinner version of this same tendency in Rawls and Habermas
- and (as I say) Wiredu - than I see in Aristotle and Kant. I draw from all 
this a findmg-cww-recommendation, which bears directly on the question 
of African identity and ethical and racial policy: I see no evidence at all that 
moral, political, or scientific findings require in any way the admission of 
invariant, exceptionless, universal, or necessary concepts They are neither 
needed nor wanted in theoretical or practical inquiries.
1 don’t deny that we idealize observed regularities of a causal sort in the 
direction of the supposed exceptionless laws of nature; and I don’t deny 
that the usual discussions of moral, political, legal, and related concerns 
(human rights for instance) regularly claim to discern the universal norms 
of human life. But where we think such claims beneficial, we cannot show 
that it is so because their universality is confirmed but only because they 
are ideologically persuasive - wherever they are persuasive. If, finally, these 
conceptions are projected from the dense (local) practices of particular 
societies, then their objective standing may be empirically challenged in a 
way no universalism seems able to defeat - except ideologically. 
Furthermore, it will be essential, in defending such concepts, to remain in 
touch with the cultural particularities that are their source, if we are not to 
fall victim to the displacement Spivak speaks of. A parallel practice, I may 
say, has been analyzed in the explanatory work of the physical sciences.19 
(Though I remind you once again that I am confining my argument to 
'practical' universals, normative universals regarding human conduct.)
I’ll add one final thought. I have always been convinced that human beings 
find it well-nigh impossible to think in terms of what would be 'right' (say, 
morally or politically or legally or religiously or aesthetically) fo r  everyone
- for every rational person, under all possible circumstances. That is, unless 
that meant, trivially, no more than whatever was formally consistent in the 
way of usage: that is, under the rule'. . .  similarly in similar circumstances'.
15 See Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws ofPhysics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983).
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(That is, no matter what we thought the term 'right' rightly designated.20) 
Utilitarianism has always seemed preposterous from this perspective. And 
Kantian 'morality' can always be forced back to coherence and consistency 
(as Hegel slyly shows), though Kant was aware of the problem and 
attempted, via 'perfect' and 'imperfect' duties, to infuse his Categorical 
Imperative with some incipient moral substance. He could not succeed of 
course, since to do so would have committed him to a 'heteronomous' 
doctrine But Rawls and Habermas have no such compunction
Wiredu arrives at the same puzzle, though he has done so through a deeper 
sense of historical and cultural 'particularities' 1 put my question to him for 
that reason, because he is plainly among the most perceptive of the new 
African philosophers who wish to bring their technical work into line with 
a sense of responsibility regarding Africa’s future.
1 agree that mere 'particularism' is hopeless - and counterproductive - and 
reduces, in moral and political matters, to intuitionism. But so also is 
'universalism' hopeless, though for different reasons. The point is: there is 
at the present time no developed conception of objectivity in science or 
morality cast in generalizing terms intended to range 'over humanity' (or 
'nature') that simply abandons essentialism and universalism and modally 
necessary norms and invariances, and is still quite capable o f  legitimating 
its invented (or idealized) 'universalities' (in covering laws or in universal 
norms). The universalism seems to be little more than the sign of 
legitimation, or the vacuous result of a vacuous hypostatization along the 
lines Spivak has tracked. The point is already there for the asking in 
Aristotle’s practical philosophy, though no one to my knowledge has rightly 
captured it.21 The deeper question is: What is the point of universalism? 
What might be offered as a third way between particularism and 
universalism? *1
!° The matter is aired, not always perspicuously, in R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1963).
11 I find it seriously misunderstood, for instance, in Martha Nussbaum’s attempt at applying Aristotle’s 
doctrine in moral matters. See Martha Nussbaum, 'Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings’, in 
Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Grover (eds), Women, Culture and Development: A Study o f  
Human Capabilities (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).
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I can only venture a few slim summary clues. For one, 'universalizing', 
construed as consistency of usage, is always a trivial constraint (though 
certainly not an unimportant one); it is, however, empty in any substantive 
sense (scientific or moral, say). 'Universalizing' in the substantive sense, 
said to be 'rationally' binding or compelling on all rational subjects, is never 
epistemically operative as such, never more than a courtesy or ideological 
flourish. Nevertheless, there is, in actual practice, hardly ever a reason for 
making a particular claim, or a claim about a particular event, action, 
object, or the like unless one implies some larger general uniformity of the 
substantive kind (not captured by the first sense of universalizing but not 
meant to violate it either), which might then be pressed into service But 
what the epistemological status of such generalizations is is an entirely 
separate question for which we obviously lack a convincing decision 
procedure.
Finally, in spite of all this, substantive disputes about general, not 
universalized, regularities (both theoretical and practical, both empirical 
and prescriptive, both normative and non-normative) are admitted to be 
open to objective and disciplined dispute. The reason we resist 
universalizing here is because we believe we exceed our better intuitions 
wherever we move from determinate contexts of experience to the 
abstractions of exceptionless universals. In this sense, even theory is a form 
of praxis and is constrained by the conditions of local application.
It is on the strength of such considerations that I say that 'racial' politics, 
'pan-Africamsm', and the like, are, when universalized, merely ideological 
and utopian; when, by contrast, they serve to instruct, to identify the key 
words for flaggering favoured policies, circumscribed by the limits of 
meaningful and effective choices in familiar contexts, they have a chance 
of being reasonable - in the sense in which debates about commitment are 
linked to the conditions of actual historical life.22 But I would not say we 
ever escape ideological loyalties in practical matters; and I would not deny
22 Quite by accident, I have found the good sense of these clues (unintentionally) confirmed by an 
exchange of views just published in Metaphilosophy, XXX (1999), on particularism and 
universalism, between Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Bernard Gert, and Jonathan Dancy.
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that a similar constraint affects the sciences. We do not usually speak of 
ideologies in theoretical matters; but it comes to much tire same thing to 
admit that 'objectivity' (not neutrality in the canonical sense) is recovered 
only in a critical and constructivist way. But that seems to be enough to 
permit the effective resolution of disputes. 1 have no doubt that conceding 
this much alters our utopian expectations and the logic of political 
reasoning.
I permit myself one last small clue. Reflexively, at level of sociological 
description, normative regularities may be empirically confirmed If they 
are invested with greater normative force - for instance if they are judged 
to be essential or universal or binding on an entire people or even mankind - 
they cannot fail to be ideological That is not a defect in my opinion. But 
if they are ideological, they will be contested. Senghor’s négritude is a 
specimen case: it correctly perceived the ideological usefulness of trading 
in 'essences', but it turned out to be politically and culturally short-lived. 
Politics and morality in the largest sense are, I should say, experiments in 
what may be projected in the direction of the universal from the general 
practices that effectively support the cultural norms that obtain among an 
actual people. A genuinely grand vision of this sort, for instance those of 
the great religions, effectively coopts the local norms and practices of many 
peoples and holds their loyalty through pertinent crises. That is what the 
vision of pan-Africanism is seeking The point to bear in mind is that what 
may be 'found' will have been constructed, but constructed in a way to 
catch up the diverse particularities of the populations to be unified. To say 
that, where successful, these universalities are actually 'there', may actually 
be found, is to put the conceptual cart before the conceptual horse. To 
refuse to think in terms of 'universals' is to choose to be politically 
ineffectual.
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DIALECTICS AND LOGICALITY 
Between cultural diversity and ontical universality
Prof D.F.M. Strauss
Dean, Faculty o f the Humanities, University o f  the Orange Free State
INTRODUCTION
Against the background of some historical transitions which shed light on 
the modemity/postmodemity discrepancy, an attempt will be made to 
explore important insights of prof. E D Prinsloo regarding logical 
universality and cultural particularity. In doing this attention will also be 
given to ontical features to be acknowledged in a dialectical understanding 
of motion - once again finding a point of connection in important analyses 
and distinctions made by prof. Prinsloo. The outcome of these reflections 
will finally be used to consider anew the dilemma of (cultural) relativism.
What brought universal reason into an impasse?
During the last number of centuries many more or less related changes 
emerged on the horizon of the self-understanding of the Western scholarly 
mind. The glory of an unbridled appreciation of the power and scope of the 
universalities of human reason did not survive the confines of the age of 
Enlightenment too well - although the way in which many portray the long­
standing influence of modernity may create that impression.
Soon after the heyday of the 18th century rationalism radically new 
alternatives emerged. Niebuhr, the tutor of Leopold von Ranke, 
demonstrates the transition from the 18th to the 19th century in a 
remarkable way. From the romantic movement - including Goethe and 
Schiller (Germany), Bilderdijk and Da Costa (The Netherlands), and 
Shelley and Keats (Britain) - Niebuhr receives his appreciation of mythical 
thought. Without relinquishing the imaginative exuberance present in myths 
and sagas, Niebuhr wants to treasure the historical way o f  thought in its 
own right.
22
With an obvious hint to Plato's classical allegory of people living in a cage 
(The Republic), Niebuhr compares the historian with a person who's eyes 
are adapted to the dark so effectively that he can observe tilings that would 
be invisible to a newcomer Where Plato evaluates these 'shadow-images' 
negatively, Niebuhr assesses them positively - on occasion he characterizes 
the work of the historian as 'work done under the earth'. In opposition to 
Plato, who acknowledges only knowledge directed at the true (static) being 
of things as worthwhile, Niebuhr is convinced that only historical change 
provides true knowledge. This kind of knowledge is the most appropriate 
type of knowledge for the human being as a living and self-developing 
entity.
Against the deification of universal (conceptual) knowledge as in the 18th 
century, we are here confronted with the importance of historical change. 
However, this irrationalist and historicist reaction against Enlightenment 
rationalism contains hidden problems that would be made explicit only by 
the end of the 19th century. It is noteworthy that this process was 
anticipated by the first critical reactions to Kant's Critique o f  Pure Reason. 
It was in particular Jacobi, Hammann and Herder who pointed out that 
Kant ignored the nature of language.1
The powerful tradition of natural law which held sway from Grotius up to 
Kant continued the conviction that there are universally valid principles of 
law founded in human reason - such as the rule pacta sunt servanda 
(agreements ought to be kept). At the beginning of the 19th century the 
historical school of law ushered in the new historicistic mode of thought 
into legal science and, as a consequence, considered the following two 
theses not open to serious objection: (1) positive law is as such a historical 
phenomenon that cannot deny its link with the past; (2) there is no room for 
a second system o f law (with an eternal and unchangeable content) next to
That Kant indeed distorted the meaning of history became clear during the 19th century - apart from 
the rise of historicism as such. The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries (by Gauss and 
Lobatsjevski) relativized Kant's table o f  categories by making it clear to what extent his analysis 
of understanding is historically dependent upon Newton's Pnncipia (1686).
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or above the historically developed positive law. In the opening article of 
the first volume of the Zeitschrift fu r geschichthche Rechtswissenschaft 
(1815) F.C. von Savigny (cf. 1948:14ff) explicitly opposed the 'historical 
school' to the 'un-historical school' of rationalistic natural law.
UNIVERSALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY
Prof. Pnnsloo (1989) approaches this problem from the angle of the 
relationship between logic and culture. He discusses examples offered by 
thinkers such as Peter Winch and Evans Pritchard. Where these thinkers 
argue that consistency is something different for Westerners and 
'primitives', Prinsloo successfully shows that both are actually observing 
the (logical) principle of non-contradiction. The applicability of this 
principle, however, presupposes the nature of logical concept formation 
which, in turn, relies on the nature of universality. But it was exactly this 
problem - regarding the relationship between universality and individuality 
- that casted a shadow over the then new claims of historicism during the 
19th century.
This becomes clear as soon as one realizes that concept formation - 
inevitably using universal features - is actually blind to what is umque and 
historically changing. Cultural events are supposedly truly umque and 
individual. Therefore the mind-boggling question of 19th century 
historicism concerns the relationship between universality and individuality.
Before we explore this development briefly it is important to realize that the 
legacy of restricting knowledge to universality (and therefore to concept 
formation) is quite old. Having introduced his primary substance Aristotle 
realized that the purely individual substance cannot be grasped 
conceptually - forcing him to introduce the secondary substance as the 
universal substantial form  of entities (cf. Metaph. 1035 b 32; De Anima 
412b 16). When this house bums down, says Aristotle, then houseness is 
still intact. The implicit identification of knowledge with conceptual 
knowledge already present in Aristotle's approach is continued by the 
adage: omne mdividuum est ineffabile. We mention just one example from
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tlie 20th century - H J de Vleeschamver (1952:213) categorically states: 
'But knowledge of the individual is simply impossible'.
Without realizing that the problem concerning the relationship between 
universality and individuality is a direct consequence of the long-standing 
identification of conceptual knowledge with knowledge as such, the 
attempt to resolve the tension in the Baden school of neo-Kantian thought, 
was made by endeavouring to distinguish the natural sciences and the 
humanities in a peculiar way.
In 1896 Wilhelm Windelband presented his influential rectorial oration: 
Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft. He distinguishes between two types of 
science: nomothetic and idiographic (the former sets out to grasp what is 
universal and the latter aims to understand the unique and individual). 
Rickert argues that we can subsume the 'world' under two different logical 
points of view: if we view it from the perspective of the universal it 
becomes nature (studied by the 'generalizing natural sciences'); if we view 
it from the perspective of the unique and individual it becomes history 
(studied by the 'individualizing cultural sciences' (19132:224). In order to 
understand better what is at stake here, we first need a critical appraisal of 
the nature of nominalism.
Nominalism: the powerful 'under-current'
According to our understanding rationalism typically absolutizes 
knowledge in terms of universal features, i.e., it deifies conceptual 
knowledge. Irrationalism, on the other hand, focuses on the unique, 
individual, unrepeatable and contingent, thus restricting knowledge to the 
approximating understanding of concepts stretched beyond the limits of 
their natural application (concept-transcending knowledge or idea- 
knowledge) The perplexing fact is that nominalism comprises both these 
elements: In respect of the typical structure o f  entities, nominalism does 
not accept any conditioning order (universal structures) for, or any 
orderliness (universal structuredness) o f  such entities. Every entity is 
strictly individual. In terms of our distinction between rationalism and 
irrationalism, nominalism surely represents an irrationalistic view of the
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nature of entities, since every individual entity is completely stripped of any 
universal orderliness (law-conformity) and conditioning order. This 
applies to both moderate nominalism, viz. conceptualism (Locke, Ockham, 
Leibniz and others), and to extreme nominalism that rejects all general and 
abstract ideas and accepts only general names (Berkeley and Brentano).
This irrationahstic side of nominalism does not, however, exhaust its 
multifaceted nature, because universal are fully acknowledged within the 
human mind, at least as general words in the case of Berkeley's and 
Brentano's extreme nominalism. This restriction of knowledge to 
universal is typical of rationalism as defined by us. Therefore, it is 
possible to see nominalism as being simultaneously rationalistic in terms 
of the universal - concepts and words - in one's mind, and irrationahstic 
in terms of the strict individuality of entities outside one's mind. Karl 
Mannheim did grasp something of this twofold nature of nominalism.
Nominalism proceeds from the unjustifiable assumption 
that only the individual subject exists and that meaningful 
contextures and formations have being only to the extent 
that individual subjects think them or are somehow 
oriented toward them in a conscious manner (Mannheim 
1982:224)
THE HERMENEUTICAL TURN': LANGUAGE AS THE NEW 
HORIZON
Dilthey explicitly introduces the issue of hermeneutical interpretation in 
order to transcend the limitations of conceptual knowledge with regard to 
universality. By doing this, Dilthey transposes the emphasis from universal 
concept formation to the possibilities of human language use. Concepts 
are supposed to be marked by their clear-cut exactness, whereas language 
pre-eminently confronts us with its ambiguity. Due to this feature, the use 
of language always requires interpretation and presupposes choice', by its 
very nature language allows for multiple interpretations. The implication 
of a hermeneutical approach for the humanities would be that they have to
26
realize that more often than not they have to work with interpretations of 
interpretations (cf. Van Niekerk 1992:31).
The advantage of language is that it displays the capability to deal with 
what is unique and individual - something to which (universal) concept 
formation is blind. The deictic feature of language, i.e. the capacity to 
point at something, already evinces the hold language can attain on what 
is individual (compare also proper names).
Habermas has a lucid understanding of how the tension between universal 
concepts and unique historical events shaped the transition from thought 
to language Of course the whole project of Dilthey's philosophy gives 
ample support for this understanding According to Habermas the problem 
Dilthev faced was the following:
How is it possible to grasp the meaning of a unique life 
context by unavoidably using general categories? 
(Habermas 1970:203).
Habermas explains that our everyday language apparently enables us to 
understand the individual by using general categories. Hermeneutics could 
only be developed fruitfully when it explicitly manages to illuminate the 
structure of our everyday language by achieving what is forbidden by the 
syntax of such a language: indirectly to communicate the inexpressibly 
individual2
It does seem therefore as if language can mediate between universality and 
individuality m a way which transcends the limitations of concept 1
1 'Offensichtlich hat die Umgangsprache eine Stniktur, die es tatsáchlich erlaubt, im dialogischcn 
Verháltnis Individuelles durch allgemeine Kategorien verstándlich zu machen. Dieser gleichen 
Stniktur muB sich auch das hermeneutische Verstehen bedienen, die ja  die alltágliche 
kommunikative Erfahrung des Sich- und Andere-Verstehens nur methodisch in Zucht nimmt. Zu 
einer expliziten Verfahrensweise láflt sich freilich die Hermeneutik erst ausbilden, wenn es gelingt, 
die Struktur der Umgangsprache in der Hinsicht zu kláren, in der sie erlaubt, was die Syntax einer 
reinen Sprache gerade verbietet: das unaussprechlich Individuelle wie immer auch indirekt mitteilbar 
zu machen' (Habermas 1970:206).
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formation. Also in this regard Mannheim had a clear understanding of 
these issues. In connection with the conceptual basis of asserting he writes:
Everything subject to assertion is to be identical for 
everyone in every assertion of it: and the concept thus 
universally valid in two ways: referable to all objects of 
the same kind (the concept 'table' is thus applicable to all 
tables that have ever existed or ever will exist), and valid 
for all subjects who ever will utter it, and who accordingly 
always understand the same thing by 'table'. That this 
tendency inheres m every concept-formation cannot be 
doubted; and the creation of such a conceptual plane upon 
which one concept can be defined by others, with all 
concepts thereby forming an objective self-contained 
system, should not be denied. . . . In contrast to this, there 
is also an altogether different tendency in concept- 
formation, long in existence and rooted in a different 
movement, and this alternative must not be neglected. It 
rests on the possibility of using every concept, including 
the most general, as a name', and what is to be understood 
by name in this case is the specific property of words 
whereby they designate a specific thing in a specific 
function m its unique relationship to us in our specific 
conjunctive community.... That is precisely the miracle of 
living speech: that it always places each word in a umque 
context and that it can bestow an individual meaning (I 
am emphasizing - DFMS) to each word from the specific 
totality of the sentence, and even more, from the 
undercurrent of the communication flowing from its 
rhythm and the stream of association (Mannheim 
1982:196-197).
As a consequence, we can speak about a general shift from concept to 
meaning, from thought to language.
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The outcome of the shift from thought to language is significant: the 
allusivity and equivocal nature of language, particularly well revealed in 
the role of metaphors, expands and deepens the historicistic critique of 
supposedly universally valid concepts - thus apparently strengthening the 
relativism already present in historicism 3
One of the prominent philosophers and social thinkers of our day, Jurgen 
Habermas, remains remarkably critical about the relativistic consequences 
of historicism and the 'postmodernist' shift to language Over against 
Rorty's relativistic position (cf Rorty 1980) and in line with the arguments 
in favour of acknowledging the universality of the principle of non­
contradiction advanced by Prinsloo, Harbermas still wants to maintain the 
idea of truth and its implied universality as a necessary condition for 
humane forms of cohabitation:
If I understand Rorty correctly philosophy would have to 
pay for its new modesty with the rationality claims with 
which it was bom. With the decline of philosophy the 
conviction that the transcending power which we link to 
the idea of truth or the absolute, necessary conditions for 
humane forms of society, should also pass away.4
These considerations invite us to return to the underpinnings of nominalism 
by paying special attention to its irrationalistic side. This side indeed 
offers an equally 'fruitful' breeding ground for the development of 
philosophical perspectives. Linked to it, we often see the rise of the 
typically irrationalistic tendencies of modem philosophy: the development 
of the post-Kantian freedom idealism (in which the ideology of the unique
’ Dilthey did not want to concede that the liberation achieved through historicism inevitably ends in 
relativism. Nietzsche saw the link between relativism and the secularization of Christianity: 
'Relativism is based on Nietzsche's view that absolute truth is found on "our longest lie," the belief 
in God' (Hollinger 1994:66).
4 'Die Philosophie soil, wenn ich Rorty recht verstehe, far ihre neue Bescheidenheit mit dem 
vemunltanspruchen bezahlen, mit dem doch dasphilosophischen Denkenselberzur Welt gekommen 
ist. Mit dem Absterben der Philosophie soli auch die Oberzeugung vergehen, dafl die 
transzendierende Kraft, die wir mit der Idee des Wahren oder des Unbedingten verbinden, eine 
notwendige Bedingung far humane Formen der Zusammenlebens ist’ (Harbermas 1983:11).
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ethnic spirit of every trans-individual nation-organism appears - followed 
by Nazism), the emergence of existential philosophy, pragmatism, 
personalism, neo-Marxism (except Habermas), historicism, the existential- 
phenomenological movement1 and what is currently designated as 
postmodernism.
Prof. Prinsloo justifiably reacted to the extreme consequences of 
historicism with regard to cultural diversity. Acknowledging cultural 
diversity and historical uniqueness does not eliminate universality but 
presuppose it. Only if the phenomenon of culture is something universally 
human is it possible to differentiate between the peculiarities of different 
cultures.
Because Pnnsloo's confrontation with Marxist dialectics opens up other 
significant avenues to combat cultural relativism we now pay attention to 
this issue.
Does movement deny formal logic and the principle of non-contradiction?
Prof. Prinsloo (1989:97) mentions the Marxist conviction that 'movement 
results in the abolition of the principle of non-contradiction which in its 
turn involves a denial of the validity of formal logic'. Engels simply 
continues the mechanistic main tendency of classical physics (Hobbes, 
Newton) which attempts to understand matter purely in terms of motion 
He claims that matter is inconceivable without motion (Engels 1954:92) 
and considers motion to be the only universally valid reality studied by 
science (1954:317; cf. Lobkowicz 1973:471).
According to the Marxist physicist Horz classical physics (Newton and his 
successors) teaches that a moving body finds itself at a specific point in 
time at a specific place. But if this is the case, he continues, it will be 
impossible to gain an understanding of true movement. As an alternative 
Hórz chooses the conception of motion developed by Engels. In his
In which all honour is given to the uniquely-individual and the contingent.
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dialectical-materialistic conception one can say that a moving body engaged 
in a change of place at the same time is and is not at a specific place. Hórz 
(1967:58) explains the inner tension (dialectics) of this position as follows: 
'insofar as the body changes from one place to another it moves, and the 
Body reaches, as a result of its movement, always at a specific time a 
specific place' This is according to him the 'dialectical antinomy 
(Widcrspruch)’ of change o f  place. A formulation precluding every logical 
contradiction runs as follows: 'as the result of movement a body finds itself 
at a specific place and with regard to the movement itself the body does not 
find itself at a specific place' (Hórz 1967:58)
This subtle distinction between contradiction and 'Widcrspruch' highlights 
an important distinction normally neglected in the study of logic In order 
to elucidate this point we have to explore an important distinction and 
insight of Prof. Prinsloo's into the shortcomings of reductionism He says 
that the most common counter argument against the dialectical Marxist 
account of movement and change is the one based on reductionism: 'we 
cannot explain movement by reducing it to rest or dynamism in terms of a 
static state' (Prinsloo 1989:98).
Descartes already negatively demonstrated this argument through his view 
of the res extensa. Descartes identifies motion with a 'change of situation' 
(Meditations, III). His general description is: 'But motion in the 
ordinary sense of the term, is nothing more than the action by which a body 
passes from  one place to another' (Principles, Part II, XXIV) If the 
essential feature of a body is its extension (i.e., the place it occupies), then 
motion, defined as a 'change of place', is a self-contradictory notion: any 
change of place must imply a change of essence - but then the enduring 
subject of motion is abolished! Zeno, a pupil of Parmenides, formulated 
this antinomy with astonishing lucidity in the last of his four fragments that
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is still accessible to us: 'Whatever moves, neither moves itself in the space 
which it occupies, nor in the space which it does not occupy1 (B Fr.4).6
A contemporary account of the 'impossibility' of motion is given by Von 
Kibéd. He makes an appeal to the (logical) law of identity in order to 
account for the constancy of an entity: 'The principle of identity, according 
to which everything is only identical to itself, actually forbids every change, 
every becoming-different, every stepping-outside of a substance from its 
being-itself (1979:59). He is well aware of the fact the some thinkers (like 
Aristotle) employ the distinction between essence and appearance to 
account for both the identity and the change of an entity:
The difficulties accompanying the concept of the changes 
of an unchangeable thing are side-stepped by dividing the 
entity into an essential and accidental part, thus producing 
the possibility to associate unchangeability with its 
essence and changeability with what is accidental (Von 
Kibéd 1979:60).
However, according to Von Kibéd (1979:60) this would not help us, 
because the accidental features of an entity are subject to the law of identity 
too: 'according to the principle of identity also the accidental must remain 
identical to itself and cannot abolish its essence, which is given in its 
accidental nature'. His conclusion is therefore to be expected: 'The concept 
of change is therefore logically unthinkable' (1979:60). What is needed in
6 Without being able to articulate it further, I have to mention that there is an important difference 
between an antinomy - pertaining to the irreducibility of a unique mode of explanation - and a mere 
logical contradiction - pertaining to the mere confusion of two entities or different properties 
belonging to the same mode. For example, Descartes's impasse mentioned above concerning the 
abolition of the 'essence' of a body in his 'definition' of motion as change of place is based upon the 
antinomic attempt to define motion in non-kinematical terms, namely the spatial term place and 
the physical term change - as correctly pointed out by Prof. Prinsloo. Zeno's arguments against 
movement are antinomic in a similar way because in them he reduces the kinematical aspect to the 
(static) spatial aspect Whenever an attempt is made to define something primitive, (antinomic) 
reduction is the inevitable result Merely confusing two figures within the spatial aspect such as is 
exemplified in the Cassirer-Russell example of a round triangle/square/circle, is only 
contradictory, not antinomic. The ontic principle of the excluded antinomy serves as the foundation 
of the logical principle of non-contradiction and not vice versa.
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order to account for change, namely 'the concept of causality, is logically 
seen non-transparent and shows the limits of logical explanation' (Von 
Kibéd 1979:60-61).
The question is: is it possible to explain the relationship between constancy 
and dynamics (change) in a non-antinomic way?
Galileo did realize that motion ought to be acknowledged in its irreducible 
uniqueness. For that reason one cannot speak about the cause of motion! 
If (uniform) motion is unique and irreducible - i.e., a primitive notion in the 
discipline of kinematics, then one can only speak about the cause o f  a 
change in motion (acceleration or deceleration) and not of a cause of 
motion as such The law o f inertia as formulated by Galileo captures the 
irreducibility of a uniform or constant motion A convenient shorthand to 
record this unique and irreducible meaning of the kinematic mode is to 
designate it as constancy. The law o f  inertia therefore highlights the 
primitive meaning of (kinematic) constancy. That this law was anticipated 
by thinkers from the fourteenth century is convincingly shown by Maier (cf. 
1964 132-215). In a different context P. Janich also emphasizes a 'strict 
distinction between phoronomic (subsequently called kinematic) and 
dynamic statements' (1975:68).7
The Pythagoreans stumbled upon the irreducibility of space in their 
discovery of incommensurability (the discovery of irrational numbers). 
Their inability to account for these numbers arithmetically lead to a 
fundamental geometrization of mathematics and at the same time provided 
a starting-point to the space metaphysics of the subsequent medieval 
speculation about the 'chain of being'. The rise of the mechanistic world 
view in early modernity introduced the switch to a new mode of 
explanation: the aspect of movement (the kinematical aspect). This 
mechanistic main tendency of classical physics lasted until the end of the 
19th century. The last great representative of this mechanistic approach
Kepler and Newton introduced force as a dynamic principle by viewing it as a cause of change o f  
motion. Cf. Stafleu 1987:74.
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was probably Heinrich Hertz - the German physicist who did experimental 
work about electromagnetic waves more than a hundred years ago 8
Within the confines of a kinematical perspective all processes of nature are 
reversible. However, already in 1824 Carnot discovered fundamentally 
irreversible physical processes. The implications of this discovery were 
further developed simultaneously by Clausius and Thompson in their 
formulation of the second main law of thermodynamics.9 10In 1865 Clausius 
introduced the term entropy. This law accounts for the irreversibility o f  
physical processes - it determines the direction of a physical (or chemical) 
process in a closed system. In 1910 Planck therefore justifiably states that 
the 'irreversibility of natural processes' confronted the 'mechanistic 
conception of nature' with 'insurmountable problems' (1973a:55).
Twentieth century physics therefore had to explore the physical mode of 
explanation properly The core meaning of the physical is found in energy 
operation. The operation of energy always causes certain effects - and it 
stands to reason that the relation between cause and effect is a- 
symmetrical: the effect always comes after the cause.1"
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF 
ONTIC UNIVERSALITY
From our preceding considerations it must be clear that universality and 
individuality are irreducible traits of reality - i.e., that one can only opt for 
the one while opting simultaneously for the other one as well. Similarly,
8 This work not only established him as the founder of wireless telegraphy and the radio, but also 
immortalized his name in the unit of frequency (Hertz) named after him. Soon after his death in 
January 1894 his large theoretical work appeared: 'The Principles of Mechanics developed in a New 
Context' (Die Prinzipien der Mechanik in neuem Zusammenhange dargestelll (312 pp ) 
Restricting himself to the first three functional aspects of reality only (represented by the concepts 
time, space, and mass) he rejects the concept force (a physical concept) as something inherently 
antinomic (cf. Katscher 1970:329). Thus we can see how consistently he carried through the 
mechanistic approach.
5 The first law is the law of energy conservation.
10 Kant already realized that succession ought to be distinguished from causality (cause and effect). 
Although the day succeeds the night and the night the day none could be seen as the cause of the 
other.
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constancy (kinematical) and change (physical) are also both unique and 
mutually coherent. Change can only be detected on the basis of an 
underlying element of constancy. These statements are only possible on the 
basis of an acknowledgement of the modal universality of the aspects of 
number, space, the kinematic and the physical." These modes of 
explanation provide us with the most basic statements a philosopher can 
make about reality, namely that everything is unique (the numerical 
intuition of its being distinct), that everything coheres with everything else 
(the spatial intuition of connectedness), that everything remains constant 
(tiie kinematical intuition of constancy) and that everything changes (the 
physical intuition of cause and effect).
However, anyone at home in the contemporary postmodern philosophical 
climate may react by saying that the most basic orientation of a philosopher 
has to include the historicity and meaning-constructed nature of our world 
This is indeed the huge contribution of the 19th and the 20th centuries to 
the history of philosophy - the discovery and acknowledgement of the 
modal universality of the historical mode of explanation and the 
sign/meanmg mode of explanation. But just as the consideration of the first 
four modes suffered from one-sided over-estimations (everything is 
number; everything is space; everything is motion; everything is change) 
also these last two fell prey to similar distortions: everything is history and: 
everything is interpretation!
A brief rebuttal on historicism may be the following argument: If 
everything is history, as the historicist claims, then nothing remains which 
could have a history. This is the irony of historicism: that which is exalted 
to the one and all loses all meaning, since, if everything is history, nothing 
remains which can have a history, and we loose history itself! Phrased in 1
11 In passing we must note that Einstein's theory of relativity is actually a theory of constancy because
he postulates the velocity of light c in a vacuum as a constant, and whatever moves is moving 
relative to this order of constancy. Without arguing it we have to point out that the foundational 
position of the kinematical aspect with regard to the physical aspect also suggests a more 'exact' 
formulation of the first main law of thermodynamics: it ought to be seen as the law of energy 
constancy.
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terms of the claims of hermeneutics, we may quote Grondin m his lucid 
work on philosophical hermeneutics (with an introduction by Gadamer)
Some have tried to construe the universal claim of 
hermeneutics as climaxing in the thesis that everything is 
historically conditioned, a thesis supposed to be 
universally valid. If this thesis is meant to apply 
universally, then it must apply to its own claim, which 
must itself be historically limited and therefore not 
universal. The universal claim of hermeneutics is thus 
considered self-contradictory (Grondin 1994:10).
The human condition is co-determined by a multiplicity of irreducibly 
cohering ontic modes. The inherent modal universality of these modes 
explains why one can never escape from functioning within each one of 
them. Consequently it does not help to attempt 'escaping' from anyone, also 
not from the historical mode and the sign mode The acknowledgement of 
historicity (obviously a universal trait!) and the (universal) human quest for 
meaning ought to make us modest in our claims. But smce all 
changefulness presupposes something constant we don't have to fall prey 
of a nihilistic relativism either.
Smce I do believe that some of the core insights of Prof. Pnnsloo explored 
in this contribution solidly support my stance, my hope is that he will 
nonetheless assess my account critically!
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